Please note that this is a revised version of the original working paper. In particular, we substantially extended the sample across countries and time. As a result of these changes, our findings changed considerably compared to the first version of the paper.
Introduction
The law and economics literature makes an important distinction between de jure and de facto judicial independence (dejureJI and defactoJI). Analysing the relationship between them is interesting for a number of reasons. Doing so can tell us to what degree formal legislation is more than just cheap talk. It can also tell us whether the degree to which formal legislation is actually implemented depends on a country's institutional background. And it is, at least potentially, policy-relevant. Although defactoJI appears to be conducive to economic development, dejureJI is not significantly correlated with it (Voigt et al. 2015) . Thus the question is whether a government interested in spurring economic development can do so by passing legislation that improves its country's dejureJI.
It seems straightforward to assume that increases in dejureJI will be followed by increases in defactoJI. However, findings in the scarce empirical literature are not so straightforward.
Using cross-sectional data, Hayo and Voigt (2007) discover that the two are positively related and that dejureJI is the single most important predictor for defactoJI, although the magnitude of this relationship is small. Melton and Ginsburg (2014) report that none of the conventional variables used to proxy dejureJI are significantly correlated with defactoJI. Indeed, a figure in their paper (2014, 189) suggests that defactoJI might even cause adjustments in dejureJI, instead of the other way around as is commonly assumed.
The extant studies rely on simple cross-sections, but the lack of a time dimension makes inferences problematic. Here, we use panel data analyses to study the long-term relationship between dejureJI and defactoJI for two samples: (i) the period 1955-2015 (61 years) covering 49 countries and (ii) the period 1975-2015 (41 years) covering 87 countries. This is possible due to the development of time-based indicators for dejureJI and defactoJI. Voigt (2014, 2016) use and extend the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al. 2009 ) and derive a time-varying indicator for dejureJI based on factor analysis; Linzer and Staton (2015) design a latent variable measurement model combining eight extant indicators to map out defactoJI across time. In the latter's context, missing data are a big problem and they deal with it by employing Bayesian methodology. Holsinger et al. (2017) provide an update of this dataset and we employ its most recent version (April 2019). For the present analysis, we reconstructed the de jure JI indicator from Hayo and Voigt (2016) using the most recent data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (April 2019).
The sample is not quite representative of the world, as about one-quarter of the countries became OECD members before 1973 and some regions are not adequately covered. See the Appendix for a list of the countries and summary statistics.
The Long-Term Relationship Between De Jure and De FactoJI
We first run a static random effects panel data regression, where we use dejureJI to explain defactoJI. 1 For the period 1955-2015, Model 1 in Table 1 shows a significantly positive relationship between the two variables, which is in line with the theoretical view in the literature and the empirical findings based on cross-sectional data. A one standard deviation increase in dejureJI is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation increase of defactoJI and the average marginal elasticity is 0.2. Thus, the absolute size of the effect is small, suggesting that the linkage between the two variables is weak. This result is in line with Melton and Ginsburg's (2014) conclusion.
Are these findings robust? Since we find substantial autocorrelation, we re-estimate the model using GLS with an autocorrelated error of order 1 and allowing for heteroscedastic panels. This model (Model 2 in Table 1) shows that the qualitative result remains, but the quantitative effect is even smaller. In Models 3 and 4, we split up the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries to proxy for different degrees of institutional development. We observe a (non-significant) negative coefficient for the OECD sample, whereas the coefficient for non-OECD countries is similar to that in Model 1. Thus, the positive relationship between dejureJI and defactoJI is driven by the non-OECD countries. Do these findings hold when increasing the number of countries while reducing the observation period? Corresponding Models 5 to 8 for the period 1975-2015 show strikingly similar results. The preceding conclusions assume that both variables are stationary or at least cointegrated.
Panel unit roots have very weak power and, thus, a sufficiently long time series is essential for valid inference. Table 2 sets out the time-series behaviour of our dataset. Employing various tests, we obtain conflicting results, but, overall, we find more evidence of non-stationarity.
The cointegration tests suggest that the variables are cointegrated in both samples. 
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Cointegration tests: Kao (1999) ; Westerlund (2005) . Tests use demeaning, five lags, and a trend.
This finding leads us to compute error-correction terms (EC) based on the results from Model 1 in Table 1 . Accounting for the potentially dynamic nature of the relationship of interest, we run EC models using the first difference of the JI variables and employing five lags. The outcome in Table 3 shows that the ECs are highly significant in all specifications. Thus, the relationships estimated in Table 1 appear to be long-term equilibria, deviations from which affect defactoJI's short-term adjustment in a stabilising way.
Do we find short-term Granger causality from dejureJI to defactoJI? In the case of Models 1 and 3 in Table 3 , there is a significant test outcome. However, in Model 1, the absolute effect of the short-term dynamic reaction is small and negative-a 1 percentage point increase in dejureJI leads to a decrease of 0.13 percentage points in defactoJI-whereas it is roughly zero in Model 3. These conclusions generally carry over to the GLS specifications in Models 2 and 4. Thus, for OECD countries, there is a negative or zero relationship between the two variables in the short run and a positive one in the long run.
Finally, we analyse whether the causal relationship might run from defactoJI to dejureJ, as suggested by the figure in Melton and Ginsburg (2014, 189) . We use a VAR-type setup (Johansen 1992) to test for weak exogeneity of defactoJI with regard to dejureJI. In three of the four tests we cannot reject the null of weak exogeneity (see Table 3 ), which generally supports the view that defactoJI adjusts to dejureJI and not the other way around. Moreover, we find little evidence of Granger causality running from defactoJI to dejureJI. 
Conclusion
Using two recently published new indicators for defactoJI and dejureJI, we study their longterm relationship as well as their short-term dynamics. We find that the relationship between the two variables is positive and weak in terms of magnitude, in line with findings by Melton and Ginsburg (2014) . The positive relationship is driven by non-OECD countries. In the short term, we discover a generally negative relation between the two variables, which is consistent with results from Gutmann and Voigt (2019) for EU countries.
We find evidence of cointegration between the two variables, which, according to the Engle-Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger 1987) , can be interpreted as the existence of long-term equilibria. Finally, we discover little evidence of reverse causality, that is, that dejureJI is influenced by defactoJI. 
C) Constructing a factor as an indicator for dejure JI
The procedure is based on Hayo and Voigt (2016) . We construct dummy variables of the following items and use these for a factor analysis. The first factor is then considered an indicator of the latent variable dejureJI.
(1) Judicial independence mentioned in constitution?
(2) Does the constitution provide for judicial opinions of the highest ordinary court?
(3)-(4) Which of the following aspects is mentioned about opinions for the highest ordinary court? (i) reasons are required in court decisions, (ii) dissenting opinions are allowed.
(5) Judiciary nominates chief justice of the highest ordinary court? (6) Judiciary approves of nominations for the chief justice?
(7) Chief justice must have a certain education? (8) Chief justice must be a non-felon? (9) Chief justice must be a lawyer?
(10) All justices of highest ordinary court must be lawyers? (11) To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for interpretation of the constitution? Supreme court only (12)-(13) Who has standing to initiate a challenge to the constitutionality of legislation? (i) public (by complaint) and (ii) courts (14)-(15) What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality? (i) law is void, (ii) law is void for specific case, but remains on the books, or (iii) law is returned to the legislature for revision/reconsideration (16) Are there provisions for dismissing judges? 
